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From 26 to 28 October 2001, the ISIM, in collabora-
tion with the University of Amsterdam and Cornell
University, held an international conference in Lei-
den on the 'Application of Islamic Law in Courts'. The
conference conveners, Muhammad Khalid Masud,
Rudolph Peters and David Powers, invited historians,
lawyers, anthropologists and sociologists to come to
Leiden to engage in a discussion on the manner in
which Islamic legal doctrine (f i q h) has manifested it-
self in daily practice as reflected in the activity of the
q a d i, or Muslim judge.
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and pious endowments, as well as civil,
criminal, and administrative affairs. A ten-
sion between central and provincial courts
reflected the shifting political framework of
the empire. As R. Gradeva observed, Ot-
toman jurists instructed q a d is to disregard
the command of the Sultan if it was not in
conformity with the s h a r ica. The local court
played a crucial role in the transformation of
the legal system into an instrument of impe-
rial rule. Writing about Gaziantep, L. Pierce
argued that the sovereign and his subjects
sometimes had different views on law and
society, and that the local q a d i court was the
arena in which their differing claims were
negotiated. And as A. Rafeq explained, f i q h
was sometimes used to serve the interests
of influential groups, including the military,
notables, and foreign nationals. The system-
atic recording of court documents and the
pluralistic structure of the judicial system
added to the complexity of the Ottoman
legal system.
During the colonial period, foreign legal
concepts were often superimposed upon
local laws. Tahir Mahmood noted that in the
early colonial period, Indian judges deter-
mined facts from the perspective of foreign
law and issued their judgments on the basis
of local law. Rudolph Peters observed that in
Nigeria, colonial rulers allowed s h a r ica c r i m-
inal law to be applied, thereby creating a di-
chotomy between federal and area courts;
the latter often being called 's h a r ica c o u r t s ' .
In the early 19t h century the jurisdiction of
s h a rica courts was reduced to the law of per-
sonal status. In the 20t h century, those
s h a rica courts that continued to function
had an increasingly narrow jurisdiction.
Writing about contemporary Yemen, B.
Messick described the s h a r ica courts that
operate today as 'hybrids' that combine Is-
lamic legal categories and methods with im-
ported legal forms, as spelled out in codes
issued by nation-states. Mahmood noted
that in East India s h a r ica courts have operat-
ed since 1917 as private institutions that
enjoy the respect of the Indian government
for their work as alternate institutions of dis-
pute resolution and arbitration.
S h a r ica courts also contribute to the polit-
ical objective of nation building, even if only
as a formal constitutional requirement. A.
Layish described how s h a r ica courts in mod-
ern Libya play an important role in integrat-
ing Bedouins, who are undergoing a
process of sedentarization, into normative
Islam. In Nigeria, Rudolph Peters noted, the
constitution calls for the application of a re-
cently enacted (s h a r ica) penal legislation,
but many legislators and judges treat this
requirement as a legal formality.
C o u r t s
The application of penal law poses prob-
lems relating, on the one hand, to the intri-
cacies of Islamic procedural law and, on the
other, to restrictions and special rules that
govern the criminal process. The testimony
of upright witnesses, which is the lynchpin
of Islamic court procedure, is closely associ-
ated with notions of social integrity. Q a d is
understood 'p r o of' in a broad sense. The
term t h u b u t (literally 'proof'), which in some
court records signifies a q a d i's certification
of a legal act, must be differentiated from a
h u k m, or formal q a d i judgment, as M  l l e r
demonstrated. Although it is often asserted
that f i q h does not attach any validity to writ-
ten documents, Powers and Layish drew at-
tention to authorized written documents,
known as rasm istir'a and shahadat al-naql,
that were commonly submitted as evidence
in North African courts; in fact, these docu-
ments are discussed at great length in Mali-
ki legal texts. In some settings q a d is and
muftis worked closely with one another; in
others, q a d is seem to have done their work
without the assistance of muftis. As A. Chris-
telow explained, a special tribunal known as
the m a j l i s was established in Algeria in the
early 20t h century to assist q a d is and emirs,
but was later abolished.
Several authors explored the manner in
which the social and legal perceptions of
the q a d i affect his handling of a litigation
(k h u s u m a) and issuance of a judgment
(h u k m). In Indonesia, J. Bowen observed,
judges invoke broad social norms when is-
suing their judgments. Similarly, as L.
Welchman wrote in her paper, in divorce
disputes Palestinian judges balance their
knowledge of f i q h by exercising judicial dis-
cretion on the basis of their perceptions of
what constitutes acceptable or unaccept-
able behaviour on the part of the wife; these
perceptions are gendered (q a d is invariably
being men) and may vary across time and
s p a c e .
According to Islamic legal doctrine, a
h u k m is 'a text that contains a record of a lit-
igation together with the final ruling by the
judge'. It is 'a final judgment that concludes
a claim'. As noted, the Mamluk documents
demonstrate that 'there is a clear legal dis-
tinction between an order (a m r) or action
(f icl) of a q a d i, on the one hand, and his judg-
ment (h u k m), on the other. It is possible for a
q a d i to issue a court decision without issu-
ing a binding judgment. A judgment comes
into existence and acquires its binding na-
ture only when the q a d i explicitly states
'hakamtu bi kadha' (I have issued a h u k m
about this matter). According to Messick,
'[t]he Yemeni h u k m has features that are dis-
tinctive with respect to what we know of
s h a r ica court judgments elsewhere prior to
the advent of modern jurisdiction.'
Court records
Although we possess a wealth of historical
and doctrinal sources for the period be-
tween the 9t h and 16t h centuries, we have
virtually no court records for this period,
with the exception of the Haram al-Sharif
documents (14 t h century) and transcriptions
of court decisions in literary sources. S i j i l l a t
only begin to appear in the 16t h c e n t u r y .
Several explanations were offered for this
puzzling riddle: a h u k m is only valid for the
specific case about which it was issued; it
does not create a legal precedent; jurists
were critical of the activity of q a d is and
therefore did not record and transmit their
judgments; jurists were concerned with the
systematic integrity of the legal system, not
with the facts of a particular case; and the
judgment of a q a d i was intimately linked to
the legal facts established by witness testi-
mony. Authors used fatwas and biographi-
cal literature to reconstruct q a d i j u d g m e n t s .
K. Masud spoke about the early Umayyad
q a d i judgments on alimony payment to the
wife in divorce cases. 
The conference papers are not available for public
distribution at this time. Authors may be contacted
through the ISIM. Muhammad Khalid Masud, Rudolph
Peters and David Powers will edit the papers as an
ISIM publication, which is expected to appear in 2003.
For further information, please contact the ISIM:
i s i m @ l e t . l e i d e n u n i v . n l
Rudolph Peters
and Baber
Johansen at the
c o n f e r e n c e .
Is the s h a r ica merely a system of ethical rules
and recommendations, as many have ar-
gued, or is it a legal system properly speak-
ing? What is the nature of the relationship
between legal doctrine and actual court
practice? Is Islamic law an unchanging
essence or has there been diversity in its in-
terpretation and dynamism in its develop-
ment and application? These are some of
the broad questions that were discussed
over the course of the three-day confer-
ence. The 23 presented papers addressed Is-
lamic law from the 8t h century to modern
times in areas including Bulgaria, Egypt,
India, Indonesia, Jordan, Libya, North Africa,
Syria and Zanzibar. Six general themes
emerged: modern judicial systems and Mus-
lim courts, s h a r ica courts in modern Muslim
nation-states, historical perspectives, court
documents, judicial practice, and legal plu-
r a l i s m .
Historical perspectives
Most of the authors examined the activity
of the q a d i by analysing a specific court doc-
ument or set of documents. A common
theme was the diversity and changing na-
ture of q a d i courts. One frequently raised
question was whether local practices of
judges necessarily qualify as 'Islamic law'. As
Islamic legal norms were translated into
local practices, there emerged a wide range
of court structures, procedures, documents
and judicial reasoning. As Erin Stiles noted,
the Muslim court in Zanzibar constitutes a
public space where people negotiate their
rights within the framework of f i q h. Refer-
ring to contemporary Syrian courts, Taima
Jayoush observed that the courtroom is a
site of negotiation where the judge is guid-
ed by both cultural and legal norms. Similar-
ly, Najwa Qattan concluded that the q a d i
judgment constitutes a site where Islamic
legal theory finds its embodiment in local
practices that vary across time and space.
Drawing on biographical literature, fat-
was, and f i q h texts, several authors exam-
ined q a d i courts in different periods of Is-
lamic history. Although it is generally held
that court records from the period prior to
the 16t h century are not available, the Mam-
luk documents analysed by M  l l e r d a t e
from the 14t h c e n t u r y .
During the Ottoman period, which figured
prominently at the conference, s h a r ica
courts had jurisdiction over personal status
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